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This paper introduces imperfect information, learning, and risk aversion in a two sided
matching model. The model provides a theoretical framework for the commonly occur-
ring phenomenon of cohabitation followed by marriage, and is consistent with empirical
ﬁndings on these institutions. The paper has three major results. First, individuals set
higher standards for marriage than for cohabitation. When the true worth of a cohabiting
partner is revealed, some cohabiting unions are converted into marriage while others are
not. Second, individuals cohabit within classes. Third, the premium that compensates
individuals for the higher risk involved in marriage over a cohabiting partnership is de-
rived. This premium can be decomposed into two parts. The ﬁrst part is a function of the
individual’s level of risk aversion, while the second part is a function of the difference in
risk between marriage and cohabitation.
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1 Introduction
There are not many among the married who can claim that their spouses have remained
the same as they were on their wedding day. Individuals marry and subsequently discover
new characteristics in their spouses. Some of these characteristics may come as pleasant
surprises; ﬁnding out that your spouse is an excellent cook is one example. However, it
is evident from the high rate of divorce in many countries that many surprises are not as
pleasant.
Because divorce can be psychologically painful and costly, some researchers hypoth-
esize that couples may choose to cohabit instead of marrying. Whether cohabitation is a
result of increased divorce rates is unclear. Waters and Ressler (1999) study state level
data on cohabitation and divorce and conclude that the causality between divorce and co-
habitation runs in both directions. What is clear, however, is that cohabitation as a life
style has gained in popularity in recent decades. This is particularly the case in North
America and Europe. For example, between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s the per-
centage of women aged 20-24 who were in cohabiting unions rose from 11% to 49% in
France (Kiernan 1996).
Although prevalent, cohabitation is short-lived. It tends to precede marriage rather
than replace it. Bumpass and Sweet (1989) use data from the United States and ﬁnd that
40%ofall cohabitingcoupleseithermarryorstoplivingtogetherwithina year,andonlya
third of cohabiting couples are still cohabiting after two years. They also ﬁnd that 60% of
those who marry after living in a cohabiting union, marry their cohabiting partners. This
is corroboratedby more recent data from the United Kingdom. Ermisch and Franscesconi
(2000)also ﬁnd that more than half of ﬁrst cohabitingunions are convertedinto marriage.
The most frequently cited reason for unmarried individuals living together is to assess
compatibility before marriage (Bumpass, Sweet and Cherlin1991). This indicates that
cohabitation is a probationary period for many couples.
The goal of this paper is to develop a theoretical model consistent with the observed
facts on cohabitation and marriage. It is evident from empirical ﬁndings that cohabitation
is often transitory and is sometimes viewed as a kind of trial marriage. It appears to
involve less commitment as cohabiting unions are more likely to dissolve than marriages.
The model developed in this paper adopts the view that couples cohabit because they
want to evaluate one another as potential spouses. They ﬁnd out each others’ suitability
as spouses while living together. Upon ﬁnding this out, they either marry or separate. In
addition, this study incorporates imperfect information, learning and risk aversion into a
two-sided search-matching model. These are new features in the growing literature on
such models (see Burdett and Coles 1999 for a survey). It extends Rao Sahib and Gu
(2000), in which premarital cohabitation and subsequent marriage are investigated in a
risk neutral setting.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the model.
Section 3 describes the decision making of couples. Section 4 shows that cohabiting
unions occur within classes. The role of risk in cohabitingand marital unions is discussed
in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Search in the marriage market
2.1 The modelling framework
The framework used in this paper is a steady state matching model with nontransferable
utility and heterogeneousagents as developedin Burdett and Coles (1997),hereafter sim-
ply BC.
A model of a decentralized marriage market in which positive assortative mating
arises as an equilibrium outcome is developed in BC. The positive assortative mating
found in BC is in terms of a comprehensive index. This index, termed pizazz, captures
the worth of an individual as a marriage partner. If a couple marry, they each receive as
utility the pizazz of the other. Equilibrium is characterized by a class partition. Men and
women form classes with marriages occurring only among members of the same class.
There exists an ordering among classes. Men and women with high pizazz marry one an-
other while men and women with low pizazz marry one another. Not all two-sided search
models yield positive assortative mating as an equilibrium outcome; see for example,
Shimer and Smith (2000).
Narcissism is ruled out in the BC model. Having high pizazz is useful only because
it allows one to attract opposite sex individuals who also have high pizazz, and increases
the utility from marriage. The optimal policy for a single individual to follow is to marry
the ﬁrst single encounteredof the oppositesex whose pizazz is abovea certain reservation
level.The steady state is characterizedbya constantdistributionof pizazz amongthe pool
of single individuals and a balanced ﬂow of market exits and entries.
In this paper, we deviate from the BC framework in four ways. First, BC assume
that an individual’s pizazz can be instantly observed on contact. In contrast, we assume
that single individuals can observe the true pizazz of a potential partner only imperfectly
(we retain the term pizazz to mean the worth of an individual as a marriage partner).
This provides a motivation for cohabiting unions which are initiated by single men and
women in an attempt to learn each other’s true worth as marriage partners. Cohabitation
is of course just one interpretation of this information collecting period. It can also be
called courtship or dating. Couples continue to cohabit until true pizazz is revealed, and
at that point, they either marry or separate. Our approach is similar to Chade (1999),
in which individuals also observe one another’s type imperfectly. However, in Chade’s
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model individuals never learn one others’ true type. They leave the market forever after
matching on imperfectly observed type.
Second, in BC, individuals leave the marriage market forever through marriage or
death, and there is an exogenous in-ﬂow of new singles into the market. In our model,
cohabiting unions sometimes dissolve and individuals re-enter the marriage market. This
is the outcome of the revealed true type of one partner being too low for the other.
Third, it is assumed in BC that individuals are risk neutral. We relax the assumption
of risk neutrality and consider the case when individuals are risk averse. This allows us
to derive a general expression for the risk premium for marriage over a cohabiting union.
Fourth, although it is not explicitly stated in BC, the distribution of offers of marriage
from opposite-sex singles faced by an agent ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the dis-
tribution faced by an agent from a lower pizazz class. This continues to hold for the offer
distributions in our model. However, the introduction of uncertainty and learning allows
us to use the concept of second-order stochastic dominance to analyze the role of risk in
cohabiting and marital unions.
We retain, however, several of the assumptions made in BC. We assume that a large
and equal number of male and female singles participate in a marriage market. Clearly,
as men and women either cohabit or marry and leave the singles market, the distribution
of pizazz will change over time. However, we assume, as in BC, that singles are only
partially rational and believe that the environment is stationary. This is an important as-
sumption because we assume that individuals are believed to follow stationary strategies.
Individuals are assumed to adopt utility maximizing strategies given the behavior of
other singles in the market. In particular, it is assumed that participants in the marriage
market seek to maximizethe expecteddiscountedlifetime utility by searching for the best
possible matches, discounted at a rate
r to the present. The optimal policy to be followed
by individuals consists of a certain set of opposite sex singles to whom they will make
offers of cohabitation if they meet.
Themarketdistributionsofpizazzformenandwomenwhichareconsistentwithﬂow-
in and ﬂow-out distributions that are equal, make up the set of steady state equilibria. Our
focus, however, is on the decision problem faced by individuals’ Nash equilibrium rather
than the market equilibria. In our model, the calculation of the steady state is complicated
by the fact that in addition to outﬂows of singles due to marriage, cohabiting unions may
dissolve resulting in individuals re-entering the singles market. Therefore for simplicity,
death and divorce are omitted in this paper.
We next describe the model in which couples are assumed to ﬁrst cohabit and then
marry.
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2.2 The model with cohabitation
In the rest of the paper, we simplify exposition by considering the decision maker to be a
single woman who follows an optimal search strategy to ﬁnd a potential marriage partner
(the argumentsare identical for the case of a single man, and are dealt with by symmetry).
We assume that when a woman meets a man, she only observes his pizazz imperfectly.
She observes
y, though his true pizazz is
x. Symmetrically, the man also obtains a noisy
observation on the woman’s pizazz. We assume that singles believe that the distributions
of both true pizazz
x and observed pizazz
y are time-invariant.







































]. In this sense, the search-matching process is random.
We assume that observed pizazz is the sum of true pizazz and random noise. That is,
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y, a realization of
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m is expected true pizazz condi-
tional on observed pizazz, for the sake of brevity, we will refer to
m simply as expected
pizazz.
Here,
m can be interpreted is the Bayes estimate of
x, denoted
b
x. This estimate is
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0. This implies that
m
is increasing in
y. This captures the common view that ﬁrst impressions matter. This












Moreover, the assumption that
m is increasing in
y is useful because
m is then invert-







































For this woman, decisions regarding whether or not to enter a cohabiting relationship
are based on
m. Notice that
m more informative than
y since it contains inference about
x from
y. Also, it enables the woman to increase the precision of her inference about
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m is more precise than
































The second assumption (A2) we make involves the distribution of the man’s true





















). By deﬁnition, the mean of this distribution is












































































































For example, suppose that a single woman encounters two single men, denoted
A and




B respectively. Assume that man
A appears to be the



















A. Then, A2 implies that the utility of the woman marrying man A
would be higher than the utility obtained from marrying man B.





















































In addition, a parameterizing variable is needed to take into account the effect of
the woman’s own attractiveness on opportunities available to her in the marriage market
(we still treat her as the decision maker, using tilde to represent her characteristics). A
woman with high pizazz is able to attract men who also have high pizazz. However, the
woman may have a ‘bad’ day, and appear less attractive than she really is. That is, her
observed pizazz
e
y is the sum of
e
x and a large negative draw
e
" from the noise distribution.
Alternatively, she may be lucky and appear more attractive than she really is, in which
case the noise drawn is positive and large. Given that
e
y is an imperfect indicator of true
pizazz, one could ask if a possible strategy may be for the woman to simply state her
true pizazz, when she meets a man. However, this is not credible. Men who encounter a
woman are more likely to trust their own judgment than the pizazz stated by the woman.
They believe in their own estimate
e
m of her true pizazz
e
x based on observed pizazz
e
y.
Notice, however, that a woman’s
e
m is still random from her own point of view. She
does not know the future realization of the noisy version of her true pizazz observed by
men. However, the expected discounted utility of receiving no offers of cohabitation and
continuing to be single, denoted
R, has to be non-stochastic in search models. Therefore,
as
e









e is the woman’s
own expectation of her
e





m is men’s expectation of her
e
x based on her
e
y. We refer to this woman (the
decision maker) as an
e
m



















































this is a weighted average of two quantities. The ﬁrst is her true pizazz,
e
x. The second




























￿, which also holds after adding the tilde
symbol.




denote the distribution of











e being the param-
eterizing variable which reﬂects the woman’s opportunities in the market.
We assume, as it is often the case, that singles have difﬁculty contacting members of
the oppositesex and meet bilaterally (this is in contrast to Bloch and Ryder 2000 in which
couples are matched via a centralized matching procedure). To capture this uncertainty
in initiating a cohabiting relationship, we assume that for any single in the market, the
rate at which offers of cohabitation arrive follows a Poisson process. We denote by
￿ the
total arrival rate of offers for cohabitation from all men (or women) faced by a particular
woman (or man). As men and women face different opportunities because of differences


















As cohabiting unions are initiated based on a noisy signal of an individual’s pizazz,
some cohabiting unions progress to marriage when couples discover each other’s true
worth to be high enough as marriage partners while others dissolve. We assume that
cohabitingcouplesalsohavedifﬁcultydiscoveringeachothers’truepizazzwhendeciding
whether the partnership can evolve into marriage. This uncertainty is also characterized
by a Poisson process with parameter
￿, the total arrival rate of new signals that lead to the
revelation of the partner’s true type. If no such signals arrive, couples stay in their current
cohabiting unions.
￿ can also be viewed as the arrival rate of marriage offers faced by
either sex during cohabitation. The transition to marriage is not random, but depends on
whether the partner’s revealed true pizazz is high enough.
We canconsiderthematchingprocessleadingtomarriageas occurringinthreestages.
In the ﬁrst stage, which can be regardedas a “pre-draw”stage, a single individualis in the



















), the source of the randomness
of
M is
Y , which has yet to be drawn.




m. She chooses to cohabit with such a
m-type man if his
m
exceeds a certain threshold level, denoted
m
r. This threshold is her reservation demand
for the man’s expected true pizazz conditional on his observed pizazz. If not, she remains
single and the process repeats itself in the next period. It is of course possible that she
herself is rejected by the man she has encountered in which case she has no choice but to
remain single until the next period.
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The revelation of true pizazz is stochastic, and marks the third stage. We assume, for
simplicity,thatlearningoccursonlyonceandonlyduringcohabitation. At thispoint,each
party must decide whether to maintain or quit the current match. If the couple choose to
maintain the match, they are assumed to establish a formal marriage and leave the market
forever. If the cohabiting couple choose not to marry, they are assumed to separate and
return to the singles pool.
This artiﬁcial distinction between stages is made only to aid understanding. Events,
in fact, occur at random intervals in the context of the Poisson approximation that under-
lies the processes of cohabitation and marriage in the continuous-time setting. The next
section develops the optimal policy to be followed at each stage. For ease of exposition,
we continue to assume that the decision maker is a woman.
3 The decision making process
3.1 Stage 1: being single
This is the “pre-draw”stage, when a
e
m
e-type single woman awaits offers of cohabitation.
At this stage, she knows neither
x nor




































































































0 is the utility she receivesin the currentperiodof short
length







h is theprobabilitythat the













is the expected discounted value of having a future offer from an
m
0-type man in that
interval and behaving optimally later on. The probability that no offer of cohabitation










h in which case the woman has no
choice but to remain single.






























































No decision can be made at this stage, and only the Poisson process with parameter
￿
determines a random outcome.
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3.2 Stage 2: should we live together?
At this stage, the
e
m
e-type woman encounters a man and based on his observed pizazz,









m. The woman is
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accepting an offer of cohabitation from an
m-type man in this period and behaving opti-




























































h is the utility received in the current short time interval
h of being
in a cohabiting union with the
m-type man. The term
￿
h is the probability in the next
time interval
h of the woman receiving a new signal which leads to the revelation of
the cohabiting partner’s true pizazz
x. The value to the woman of receiving an offer for







). In the event that no offer of marriageis received(with
x not revealed)duringthe
next time interval






), the woman will remain in
the current cohabiting relationship. Then, as
h
!



























It should be pointed out that although there is no uncertainty once true pizazz is revealed
at some moment during cohabitation, the revelation of true pizazz is a random event. It is
only after this occurs that the couple can decide whether to marry or separate. However,
the optimal policy to be followed is determined ex-ante, before any offers of marriage
are made. Therefore, we need to introduce the Poisson parameter
￿, which links the
cohabitation and marriage stages of the model. The optimal policy for stage 2 is derived
in section 3.4.
3.3 Stage 3: should we marry?
Stage 3 is when the woman ﬁnds out the true pizazz
x, of her cohabitingpartner. She then
chooses to either separate from him or marry him. We assume that the woman receives
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). This is based on the assumption that once a couple marry, they
stay married forever and never return to the singles market. If the woman does not marry,



































The optimal strategy to be followed at this stage is a reservation pizazz policy. The


























). In this expression,
x
r is the minimum pizazz level of a man as the
marriage partner acceptable to the
e
m








x, which is shown next.
3.4 Derivation of optimal strategies.
To show that the optimal policy to be followed in stage 2 is a reservation pizazz strat-







) is strictly increasing in
m. To this end, we ﬁrst





































































) to denote the expectation taken w.r.t.
x under distribution




















































be seen to hold by examining (5) under A2. This implies that when the woman cohabits
with a
m
A-man as opposed to a
m
B -man, she will obtain a higher level of the expected
discounted utility from following an optimal strategy in seeking a marriage partner.
Assumption A2 is also important in terms of the mathematics involvedin provingthat







) is increasing in
























































































This ensures that a unique solution to the stage-2 problem exists. The optimal strategy to


























We solve for the utility of being single in stage 1 for a
e
m
e-type woman as follows (see





























































































), which is only a function of
e
x, does not depend on particular values of
x or
m. This constancy w.r.t.
m and
x is
important in establishing that a reservation strategy is optimal in stages 2 and 3.
Blackwell’s theorem (see Sargent 1987) ensures that there should exist a unique so-







































e are exchanged. The











), allows us to use the symmetry argument. These two equations are used to
derive the results on class partitioning which will be discussed in the next section.
Since the rest of the paper deals with matching and class partition, we simply denote
the type of the decision maker as
e
m
e. The type of the potential partners of this decision
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maker is denoted
m
e. As long as a sorting result is attained for one sex, the same can
be derived for the other sex by symmetry. This symmetric equilibrium induces sorting of
individuals at the aggregate level.
4 The class partition
In this section, we show that cohabiting unions occur only between couples in the same
class and that this result holds for marriages as well. The number of classes is ﬁnite in




sex singles faced by a
e
m

































Proof: In what follows,
m






























































In the above, we substitute
m





0 will be deter-




M because we assume that


















e decreases, its upper
bound may or may not fall and the resultant support will shrink if the bound does fall,

































































) needs no truncation since its mean




e. This is because the marriage search model is nested in the cohabita-
tion search model. This can be seen in (8) and will become clearer in lemmas 3, 4 and 5






) does not shrink with class partition.
Lemma 2 A higher-type single of either sex receives a higher arrival rate of the offers
for cohabitation than his or her competitors of lower types.


























) is calculated by dis-
counting the overall arrival rate of cohabitation offers








this is the probability no opposite-sex singles with type
m greater than
m




e-type person for cohabitation.
Notice that these lemmas already contain some of the elements related to class parti-
tioning. A single is better off proposing to opposite-sex individuals with types no greater
than the upper bound of her or his own type. However, the lower bound of preferences
of individuals is not yet clear. These lemmas are concerned only with the upper bound
of compatible partners’ pizazz levels. Further results based on reservation pizazz policies
are needed to identify the lower bound of a pizazz interval within which couples can be
matched.





























c. Any opposite-sexsingles below the lower
bound
m








c, identiﬁes the set of opposite-sex partners that are both attainable and ac-
ceptable. This is a set of mutually agreeable pizazz types. Note that the reservation
demand by opposite-sex singles determines the upper bound of this set while the single’s
own reservation demand decides its lower bound.
Lemma 3 The best individual of either sex accepts any member of the opposite sex also
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￿. From this and from (8), we ﬁnd that the expected discounted utility of

































































Solving this equation for
R determines the best woman’s reservation demand for the
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up the top-class for marital unions. By symmetry, the top-class of women can also be
identiﬁed. Notice that the best man (or woman)will not necessarily cohabit with or marry
the best woman(or man). This is the outcome of a positive discount rate and the difﬁculty
in encountering singles of the opposite sex.
Lemma 4 A member of the top-class of either sex cohabits with and marries any member
of the top-class of the opposite sex.
Proof: This is a natural corollary of lemma 3, and can be proved rigorously as follows.
As we have shown that the best man will accept any woman in the top-class as a partner,











) faces the same prospects as the best woman. She then faces the
entire distribution of pizazz among men and the total arrival rate of offers from all men.






























Substituting these quantities into (8) yields the expected discounted utility of being single
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) by women in the top-class other than the best woman is identical




1 by the best woman.
Lemma 5 A member of the second-class of either sex cohabits with and marries any



















] marry one another.
Proof: Consider a woman who is not in the top-class but she is the best among all women






1. This woman will be rejected by
all men in the top class, but she is the most attractive among women not in the top class.













































368 http://www.demographic-research.orgDemographic Research - Volume 6, Article 13




















































































Solving the above for
R








































). By symmetry, one can also obtain




















], and lemma 6 then follows.
Proposition 1 Singles (or cohabiting individuals) in class-
i only accept opposite-sex






n is a ﬁnite number.
Proof: Repeating the procedures in lemmas 3, 4, 5, and applying mathematical induction,

















































x. It can be proved by contradiction that
n is ﬁnite. The proof is identical to the
one in BC in which the number of classes that make up the class partition for marriage is
shown to be ﬁnite.
The implications of this theorem are as follows. First, singles can be split up into
n distinct classes. In equilibrium, matches, either cohabiting or marital, take place only
betweenthe two sexesin thesame class. Second,the class partitionformarriageis consis-
tent with that of cohabitation. Third, the aggregatematchinginducedby class partitioning
is not Pareto optimal due to imperfect information. That is, a low-type single (say, a man)
can increase his welfare through mismatch in cohabitation (this can be achieved by mis-
signalling at the partner’s expense). A cohabiting individual of higher type (a woman)
will suffer from a utility loss in comparison to what she could get when matched with
a partner of the same class under perfect information, and she has to face the prospect
of re-entering the marriage market and incurring more search costs after the relationship
dissolves. The next section addresses the issue of risk in greater detail.
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5 Risk premia, cohabitation and marriage
This section addresses issues related to the risk of mis-match and the risk aversion of
individuals. We do not however, allow strategic interaction among market participants.
That is, we rule out the possibility that individuals deliberately mis-represent themselves.
For simplicity, we drop the conditioning variable
e
m
e in what follows. The results are
obtained by linking the decision-maker’s optimal policies in stages 2 and 3. We begin
with the following proposition:
Proposition 2 An individual is more discriminating when deciding to marry than when
deciding to cohabit. That is, for any single individual, the reservation pizazz level for a
potential spouse is set higher than the reservation pizazz level for a potential cohabiting



























R. If we write
m




r in place of
x
1 to emphasize that these are








































































































x. The above equation holds not just for the
top-class, but for any class [Note 1]. Notice that (12) has two interpretations. The ﬁrst is
similar to the one found in the literature on the costs and beneﬁts of searching for a job
or for a marriage partner. The left hand side represents the opportunity cost of searching
one more time with a marriage proposal or job offer of
x
r at hand. The right hand side
represents the prospective beneﬁt of this search, which is the expected discounted utility




r. Because cohabitation unions precede
marriage, individuals may miss out on the right husband or wife if they set reservation
levels for cohabitation too high. Rational individuals should set lower reservation levels
forcohabitationthanformarriagebecauseobservedpizazzis a noisysignal oftruepizazz.

























































distribution of expected pizazz underlyingcohabitationsearch. Before a single individual









). Based on this, the individualat the pre-drawstage
has to make an ex-ante decision on the optimal policy to be followed when cohabiting or









to become more selective in considering a long-run marital partnership over a potentially








r can therefore be interpreted
as a kind of risk premium that compensates the single individual for the higher risk in
marriage versus cohabitation.
Proposition 3 If one individual is in a higher class of cohabitation than another, she or





















































0. Therefore, an individual
with higher reservation pizazz for cohabitation demands a higher reservation pizazz for
marriage than an individual with lower reservation pizazz for cohabitation.
Proposition 4 If the degree of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance is large enough, the risk
premium to compensate marriage risk is higher for an individual belonging to a higher


























































































). This proposition asserts that risk premia rise with the level of cohabitation
reservation pizazz, provided that the probability of the cohabiting individual satisfying
his or her partner’s marital reservation demand is lower than the degree of the ﬁrst-order








0. Therefore, an individ-
ual demanding a higher level for the cohabiting individual’s pizazz requests a larger risk
premium in establishing a marital partnership.
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From (12), we can see that the difference in
R
P among classes originates from the
difference in their
m







). According to this















0 . Under normality, the classes within which marriages occur
aresimply a uniformshift to the rightof the classes within whichcohabitingunionsoccur.






) which is independent of
m
r and
constant. This is summarized in the following corollary:




Proposition 5 For any risk-neutral individual in any class, the risk premium needed to
compensate for the higher risk of marriage over cohabitation is equal to the quantity of
marital risk multiplied by its price.



















































), is the probability that
the true pizazz of the cohabiting partner (say, a man) turns out to be below the individ-
ual (say, a woman)’s reservation level for marriage even though he was acceptable as a





















1 is the mod-
ifying factor in the measurement of the risk price. The higher the discount rate
r, and
the lower the transition rate
￿ of cohabitation to marriage, the smaller will be the effect







), is the loss in utility compared








r (that is, if the woman had chosen a man who was both a acceptable cohabiting
partner and an acceptable husband).
In the normal distribution case, equation (14) reduces to an equation (see Appendix
(6)), which implicitly deﬁnes the risk premium
R
P as a function of
￿
2
































































0 (that is, there is no
noise),
R




















the larger the overlap between the classes for cohabitation and marriage. Therefore, the
following corollary results:
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Corollary2 The risk premium
R




" increases. As the variance
￿
2
" increases, the overlap between the class parti-
tion for marriage and cohabitation decreases.
So far, individuals are assumed to be risk neutral. We now relax this assumption.
Note however, that relaxing this assumption does not alter the results obtained in the last
section.
Proposition 6: For any risk-averse individual in any class, the total risk premium can be
decomposed into two parts. One part compensates the individual for bearing the risk due








); the other part is due to





















































































































































the Pratt-Arrow measure of local risk premium (see chapter 4 of Copeland and Weston















































































































































































0. This result concerning the decomposition of the risk
premium depends however, on the assumption that
￿
2
" is small so that the matching risk
is not very large, and the Arrow-Pratt approximation can therefore be used.
From (18), it appears that risk aversion only matters when dividing the total risk pre-





r) compensates the searching single in-










a compensates for risk aversion. However, this
may not be the case even when the underlyingdistributions are normal. In this case under






is lower under risk aversion than under risk neutrality, and risk aversion may make a
difference in affecting the total risk premium in addition to the decomposition.
Corollary3 Thetotalrisk premiumis lower underrisk aversionthanunderrisk neutrality
in the normal distribution case.
In this case, singles will not set their marriage reservation pizazz
x
r too high given
their
m
r. This is similar to the situation in which they do not set
m
r too high given
x
r,
in order not to miss out on the right husband or wife. This is because they are now more
concerned than in the risk-neutrality case about the positive discount rate, difﬁculties in
revealing each other’s true type, and uncertainty about receiving offers of cohabitation
and marriage.
6 Conclusion
Marriages today are commonly preceded by a period of cohabitation. For many couples,
this period of cohabitation serves as a trial marriage. It is a period in which they can
decide if their cohabiting partner is the right choice as a spouse.
Despite a vast empirical literature, mainly in demography, there are few theoretical
models that can be used to study the modern phenomenon of cohabitation followed by
marriage. This paper develops such a model using the framework of a two-sided search-
matching model. To this framework, the paper adds imperfect information, learning and
risk. This extendedmodel is consistent with empirical ﬁndings from demographicstudies
on cohabitation and marriage.
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Appendices
(1) The joint distribution of observed and true pizazz.
Suppose that the joint density of true pizazz,






















































































































































































(2) Derivation of (5).
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) yields (5) in the text of the
paper.
(3) Derivation of (8).





































































































































































































































































































Substituting (7) and (6) in the above yields (8) in the text of the paper.
(4) Derivation of (13).






























































































































From the above we obtain (13).
(5) Derivation of (14).


































































Using the conditional expectation deﬁnition and simplifying the expression gives (14) in
the paper.

























































































































































































), and using notation
￿, yields (15).
(7) Derivation of (18).
http://www.demographic-research.org 377Demographic Research - Volume 6, Article 13









































































































































































































































































































































risk premium) on the
R
H













































a the risk-neutral and risk-averse













































) traces a curve that is concave and ﬂat at
￿
r








) the function on the
L
H




) represents a curve, which lies
everywhere above 45
0 line that is just the
L
H
S of (15). The two points that result from





















last inequality, however, might be reversed for distributions that are not normal.
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Notes














































2. Stringently, the quantity of risk for class




































































































































































r in (14) to address the
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